The reason why cooperation occurs in repeated games has remained a puzzle. Earlier literature has maintained that reciprocal behavior that gives rise to cooperation can be entirely self-regarding. However, experimental evidence has shown that reciprocal behavior is other-regarding in many 1-shot games. This other-regarding behavior is believed to have an emotional foundation. We hypothesized that emotions play a role in reciprocal behavior in repeated games as well. We tested this hypothesis by measuring the psychophysiological correlates of emotions from pairs of subjects as they played a repeated Cournot duopoly game. The players, who were in different rooms and remained anonymous to each other, made adjustment decisions to their production quantities that determined their payoffs in each round. Autonomic nervous system arousal was activated when the payoffs of both players decreased in a round, whereas positive affect was expressed when the payoffs of both players increased in a round. The disgust expression was related to a player's own 1-sided increase in the payoff. Anger was expressed occasionally but less frequently when the outcome was the player's ideal outcome. An upward adjustment of the production quantity was observed when the other player did not cooperate. This had the effect of decreasing the payoffs of both players, and this was also related to an increase in the level of arousal. Our results provide evidence on how emotions are present in reciprocal behavior in a repeated social dilemma game. The results challenge recent behavioral research that has advocated self-regarded motivations of cooperation in repeated games.
What is the role of emotions in cooperation in repeated games? Mounting experimental evidence from one-shot games has shown that cooperative behavior is related to emotions (Camerer & Fehr, 2004; Camerer, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2005; Fessler & Haley, 2003; Haidt, 2007; Loewenstein, Rick, & Cohen, 2008; Phelps, 2009; Sanfey, 2007) despite the fact that in one-shot games the players interact anonymously and expect to never meet again in the same situation. Research in behavioral economics has explained cooperation in one-shot games by the players' preferences for equity and fairness and the reciprocal punishment and reward strategies that arise from these preferences (Boyd, Gintis, & Bowles, 2010; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2002; Sobel, 2005) . The concepts of emotions and other-regarding preferences are two sides of the same coin. For example, unfair offers in the ultimatum game elicit the negative emotions of anger (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996) , sadness (Harlé & Sanfey, 2007) , and disgust (Chapman, Kim, Susskind, & Anderson, 2009) .
The findings of emotional activity in cooperation in one-shot games cannot be generalized to repeated games. This is because of the folk theorem arguments that are most often used to explain behavior in repeated interaction. According to the folk theorem, reciprocal punish-ments and rewards that typically demonstrate other-regarding behavior in one-shot games can be part of an adaptive and rational response strategy and entirely self-regarding in repeated games (Fudenberg & Maskin, 1986) . Therefore, cooperative behavior in repeated games may not result at all from other-regarding motives. It could thus be hypothesized that due to these adaptive rational strategies, emotions play a lesser role in repeated interactions than in oneshot interactions. However, it can equally well be hypothesized that cooperation in repeated games arises from emotional reactions that subjects experience when observing each other's strategy adjustments that lead to relative payoff changes-one just cannot observe these motivations if one is observing only behavior. This raises the need to study the processes behind the decisions in addition to the decisions themselves.
To study the role of emotions in cooperation in repeated games, we arranged an experiment where we obtained physiological measurements of facial emotional expressions and autonomic nervous system (ANS) activity from subjects who played an indefinitely repeated Cournot duopoly game. Because of the relevance of emotions in motivation, we were especially interested in correlating emotional states with events in the game where the players observe how their payoffs change from one round to another. We also wanted to know how the measured emotional states correlated with the adjustment decisions that the players made in their strategies after observing the changes in payoffs.
We used the Cournot duopoly game to represent the social dilemma because this game allows a large strategy space but is otherwise qualitatively similar to the prisoner's dilemma and public goods games that are often used to model social dilemmas. The large strategy space allows separating intended reactions from mere adjustments (e.g., after erroneous choices) better than does the commonly used 2 ϫ 2 matrix of the prisoner's dilemma. To control for the presence of subjective ideal outcomes, we privately asked each subject for his or her ideal outcomes and include these in the analysis. Our interest was not in the behavior as such, because behavioral aspects such as equilibrium convergence or learning in the repeated Cournot duopoly game and in other social dilemma games have been extensively analyzed in the previous literature. Rather, we were interested in the emotional correlates of the behavior that we expected would include reciprocal adjustments.
During the game, we measured emotional arousal by electrodermal activity indexed by the skin conductance response (SCR) that corresponds to activation of the sympathetic branch of the ANS. Facial expressions of anger, disgust, and positive affect were measured by specific forms of electromyographic (EMG) activation that indexes facial musculature movements. The distinction between the negative emotions of anger and disgust was important because these emotions are used interchangeably in everyday language (Nabi, 2002) making selfreports of them unreliable. We also recorded decision times to index cognitive system function and to complement the emotional measurements.
The Cournot Duopoly Game
In the experiment, the players played the same Cournot duopoly game for 20 rounds with the same opponent. The psychophysiological measurements were obtained from both players simultaneously. The players remained anonymous to each other. During each round, the players made production quantity decisions. The duration of the game was not known by the players beforehand. In other words, the game was indefinitely repeated.
The payoffs in the game were quadratic with zero production costs. The payoffs were given by the functions x(a Ϫ x Ϫ y), where x is the player's own production quantity, y is the other player's production quantity, and a ϭ 24 is a parameter that describes market demand. The possible production quantities were integers 3 to 15. The payoffs were presented in a payoff matrix (see the online supplemental materials). The game has a unique Nash equilibrium x ϭ y ϭ 8 and a cooperative outcome, the symmetric joint-optimum x ϭ y ϭ 6. The reaction functions are downward-sloping (Huck, Müller, & Normann, 2001 ). This means that if the production quantities are higher than in the symmetric joint-optimum, then adjusting own production quantity downward increases cooperation and adjusting it upward decreases cooperation. If the other player has not cooper-ated but the player himself has, then an upward adjustment can be interpreted as a punishment. A downward adjustment can be interpreted as either a cooperative act if the other player has acted similarly or a corrective act if the other player has punished from not cooperating.
It is well known that subjects in experiments cooperate in indefinitely repeated Cournot duopoly games; that is, they play outcomes that have higher payoffs than the payoffs given by the Cournot-Nash equilibrium (Holt, 1995; Potters & Suetens, 2013) . Because the game we used is indefinitely repeated, any outcome that has better payoffs for both players than in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium can be supported as the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game if the players are patient enough (Schmalensee, 1988) . Many experiments with this game have found that the players aim for the symmetric joint-optimum (Huck et al., 2001; Huck, Normann, & Oechssler, 1999; Normann, Requate, & Waichman, 2014) . However, it is possible that not all players view the symmetric jointoptimum as the sole desirable outcome, because there are 13 different production quantities and the payoff matrix has 169 different outcomes. We therefore also asked the subjects to state their "ideal" outcomes at the beginning of each round. This took into account the possibility that the players had subjective ideals (see, e.g., Selten, Mitzkewitz, & Uhlich, 1997 , for a similar procedure). The ideal outcomes were not communicated to the opponent. We used the ideal outcomes as additional control variables in the analysis.
Hypotheses
We hypothesized that emotional arousal and the facial emotional expressions activate in specific ways when the players observe changes in outcomes between the rounds. The first hypothesis concerns emotional arousal.
Hypothesis 1a:
Emotional arousal is activated whenever outcomes change.
This hypothesis reflects the well-known role of emotional arousal in motivational activation when confronting changes in the environment as represented by meaningful stimuli (Bradley, 2009) . In a repeated social dilemma, a changing outcome alerts the player of a changing course of the game. Because this change can be caused by either of the players, a heightened emotional arousal works as the alert signal that is raised by the autonomic nervous system that an action to repair or restore that change is needed.
Emotional arousal, however, is not enough to inform someone about the motivational tendency, because it cannot distinguish between positively and negatively valenced motivational tendencies. Measuring two kinds of negative facial emotional expressions allows one to evaluate the motivational tendency that is related to punishments and aversion. The anger expression is known to be approach-motivated (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009) , and the disgust expression withdrawal-motivated (Chapman & Anderson, 2012) . Thus, we hypothesized that these two expressions are activated in different situations and therefore also have different behavioral implications.
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Hypothesis 1b: Anger is activated only when the player loses and the other player gains.
Hypothesis 1c: Disgust is activated in onesided losses.
Hypothesis 1c reflects the advantageous inequity aversion and disadvantageous inequity aversion components of the inequity aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) . Thus, we posited that disgust relates to two kinds of situations of inequity aversion. Aversion to disadvantageous inequity occurs when one is averse to own inequity, that is, when one's own payoff decreases but the other player's payoff increases. Aversion to advantageous inequity occurs when one is averse to the other player's inequity, that is, when the other's payoff decreases but own payoff increases. According to Hypothesis 1b, we expected the emergence of the anger expression only in situations of disadvantageous inequity. Therefore, the anger emotion is restricted to only situations that potentially motivate the subject to approach the transgressor and respond by a reciprocal punishment.
Positive affect is not found to be affiliated with a motivational tendency (Fredrickson, 2001) . However, we expected that, based on earlier research on positive emotions in economic games (see, e.g., Offerman, 2002; Xiao & Houser, 2005) , that the following hypothesis would be true:
Hypothesis 1d: Positive affect is activated in mutual gains or in one-sided gains.
Hypothesis 1d includes the assumption that positive affect can also be activated in situations where the player himself does not gain or lose but the other player gains. This hypothesis is therefore an opposite of Hypotheses 1b and 1c in the sense that those hypotheses assume that the negative emotions of anger and disgust are related to decreases in payoffs, whereas Hypothesis 1d is related to increases in payoffs.
Dual-process models of decision-making (Brocas & Carrillo, 2014; Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, 2004) argue that subjects who confront conflicting objectives resolve these conflicts by using either controlled or automated responses. In social dilemma games the conflicting objectives of one-sided and mutual gains are, by definition, always present. Especially in the situation where the other deviates from cooperation, one is conflicted between maintaining the cooperative strategy and making a costly punishment. In our case, the player can resolve to the noncooperative Nash outcome by making a small quantity adjustment from 6 to 8. This, however, is not enough for a punishment, because the resulting payoff reduction is only 8 units to the other player. Punishing with a large quantity adjustment from 6 to 10 or more is costly for both because it leads to a larger payoff reduction. We thus formed the following hypothesis that the size of the upward adjustment in the production quantity is modulated by emotional arousal (which is a correlate of automated processing) during decisionmaking:
Hypothesis 2a: The adjustment after the other's defection is higher, the higher is the level of emotional arousal.
This hypothesis suggests that the size of the adjustment, that is, the severity of the punitive action after the other's defection, is higher, the higher the emotional arousal is when making that adjustment. On the other hand, the conflict between one-sided and mutual gains is also present when the subject himself is tempted to defect from cooperation. Here the conflict arises because the instant payoff from defection is large compared to the payoff that is available from the cooperative outcome. Therefore, we also hypothesized the following:
Hypothesis 2b: The adjustment after a cooperative outcome is higher, the higher is the level of emotional arousal.
Decision time has previously been used to measure the involvement of the intuitive system in decision-making (see, e.g., Piovesan & Wengström, 2009) . We also measured, as an additional variable, decision times and correlated these with the adjustments. Our original aim was to gain insight into how the intuitive system participates in strategy adjustments. However, recently Evans, Dillon, and Rand (2015) and Krajbich, Bartling, Hare, and Fehr (2015) have argued that fast decision times reflect low level of decision conflict rather than intuitive decision-making. We therefore only report the results of decision time correlations but do not include them in any specific hypotheses, because our large matrix design is not particularly suitable for measuring conflicted alternatives with dichotomous regressors (i.e., conflicted vs. unconflicted decisions).
Method Task Structure
Each round of the duopoly game consisted of the following seven stages, which were either self-paced or paced by the computer:
1. Indicate an ideal outcome cell in the payoff matrix (self-paced), 2. Wait 10 s, 3. Choose the production quantity (selfpaced), 4. Confirm the production quantity or turn back to choosing it (self-paced), 5. Wait 10 s or more if the other player has not yet confirmed, 6. View outcomes (self-paced), and 7. Wait 10 s.
The payoff matrix was displayed at all times except at the wait stages. A table with outcomes and own ideal outcomes from all previous rounds was displayed whenever the payoff matrix was displayed. The ideal outcomes for the round were highlighted at the payoff matrix at each round (see the online supplemental materials for the payoff matrix, experiment instructions, and screenshots from the experimental interface).
Psychophysiological Measurements
The measurements were recorded in continuous time using bipolar Ag/AgCl surface electrodes attached to the subjects' medial phalanges of the volar surfaces of the left hand middle and ring fingers (for SCR) and in three muscle regions in the left hemisphere of the face (for EMG). These regions were the corrugator supercilii (corresponding to the anger expression), the levator labii superioris (disgust), and the zygomaticus major (positive affect) muscle regions. The electrode placements were as recommended by Fridlund and Cacioppo (1986) . Before the SCR electrodes were attached to the medial phalanges of the left-hand index and middle fingers, the subjects washed their hands with neutral soap. Before the EMG electrodes were attached to the subjects' facial muscle regions, the regions were cleansed with alcohol, abraded slightly, and then cleansed again with water. The measurements were recorded with NeXus-4 devices (MindMedia B.V., the Netherlands), and the signals were recorded with BioTraceϩ (V2012). Postprocessing was conducted in MatLab (Version 8.1) and the R environment (R Core Team, 2013) . The experiment was approved by the ethics committee of Aalto University and was conducted in accordance with the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki (World Medical Association, 2013) . The measurements were noninvasive and harmless and did not require medical consultation.
Subjects and Rewarding
Altogether 44 healthy subjects (24 female), or 22 pairs, participated. The subjects were Finnish speaking, and the experiment was conducted in Finnish. The mean age of the subjects was 26.1 years. All subjects were at least 20 years old, and six subjects were more than 30 years old. All subjects were right-handed computer mouse users. The subjects received a cinema voucher, worth €11, as a show-up fee, as well as a monetary reward based on their success on two randomly selected rounds. The mean monetary reward was €11.30 (SD ϭ 3.90). The lowest monetary reward was €1.50, and the highest monetary reward was €17.20. A typical length of the whole experimental session was 70 min.
The Laboratory Procedure
Two subjects at a time participated in the experiment. We went to great lengths to ensure that the subjects remained anonymous to each other, and this was also made clear at their invitations. The experimenters picked up the subjects from the opposite entrances of a large university building and timed the arrivals to the laboratory so that the subjects had no possibility of confronting each other. The two experimenters (one male, one female) were present when the subjects were prepared and when the experiment ended. After the experiment, the subjects were instructed to leave at different times and to use separate exits. The subjects were placed in separate silent and dimly lit rooms where the experiment took place. They sat in standard office chairs in front of adjustable computer tables and used only the computer mouse with their right hands to control the decision-making during the game. To exclude movement artifacts in the SCR data, the subjects' left hands were gently attached to the table with soft medical tape. Before starting the experiment, subjects received a 15-min preparation during which the experimenters elicited written consent, attached the measurement devices, and introduced the subjects to the rules of the game. The experiment lasted for 20 rounds, but the duration was not known by the subjects before Round 20 had ended.
2 After the experiment, subjects were questioned about whether they suspected having fake opponents, but no one suspected this.
SCR Analysis
The 128-Hz SCR data were analyzed using a deconvolution method where the SCR signal component of interest, the phasic SCR, was extracted from the tonic SCR component (Benedek & Kaernbach, 2010) . The method views the skin conductance activity as a convolution of a driver function and an impulse response function (IRF), where the IRF is common to both components and the driver represents the phasic SCR, that is, sudomotor nerve activity controlled by the sympathetic ANS. Before the deconvolution procedure, the raw data was down-sampled to 64 Hz and smoothed in a Gaussian window with a width of 16 samples. The IRF is represented by a biexponential Bateman function that has two goodness-of-fit parameters that were obtained by numerical optimization using MatLab. Deconvolution methods detect SCRs better than does the standard method of through-to-peak analysis, in which local maxima and minima are searched (Benedek & Kaernbach, 2010) . Such peaks may be undetectable if the SCRs are superposed, leading to underestimation of SCR amplitudes (Society for Psychophysiological Research, 2012). The arousal score was formed by integrating the deconvoluted SCRs over a 5-s time window that starts 1 s after the beginning of the result stage. This integrated SCR score was then divided by the window length in seconds to obtain the score in S (microsiemens). Emotional arousal during decision-making was measured from SCR during the consecutive choice, confirm, and wait stages, that is, the stages that preceded viewing the results from the round. The emotional arousal score during decision-making was formed by summing the amplitudes that occur within the choice, confirm, and wait stages and dividing this sum by the number of SCRs that occurred during those stages. The arousal scores were logarithmized.
EMG Analysis
The 2048-Hz EMG data were band-passfiltered offline between 100 Hz and 500 Hz, full-wave rectified, and moving-averaged within a 10-ms window. The EMG score was formed from the processed signal by taking a mean over the 6-s time window that began when the results were displayed. The baseline signal, obtained from a 6-s interval before the results were displayed, was subtracted from this score. After this, the score was logarithmized. To reduce the possibility of cross-correlation between the muscle regions and thus of inflating Type I error rates, we transformed the score into a count score, where a count was registered if the specific EMG score corresponding to the muscle region was Ͼ0 V (microvolts) whereas the scores of the other muscle regions were Ͻ0 V. For example, the count score for the levator labii (disgust) was 1 if and only if the score for levator labii was Ͼ0 V while the scores for the corrugator supercilii (anger) and the zygomaticus major (positive affect) were Ͻ0 V.
Decision Times
The decision times were the time intervals with varying lengths that began from the choice of the production quantity and ended when choice was confirmed. The recorded decision times were logarithmized.
Results
The first round was discarded from all results analyses. One subject out of 44 was discarded from all results, except from the behavioral results, due to a hardware failure. Additionally, five subjects in the SCR measurements were discarded from the final results on emotional arousal. For these subjects the SCR signal either completely failed to appear or failed to appear at some point during the experiment. The hardware failures did not affect how the experiment was conducted or how the other measurements proceeded. Statistical analyses were conducted using linear mixed models (LMMs) and generalized linear mixed models (GLMMs) where the between-subjects variance was modeled by including the subjects as random effects. The random effects are reported as b , the betweensubjects standard deviation, alongside the residual standard deviation . The analyses on the production quantity adjustments and SCR modeled temporal correlation of the decisions (see, e.g., Normann et al., 2014; Zwick & Rapoport, 2002 ) using an AR(p) within-subject correlation structure, where p denotes the lag index and 1 . . . p are the parameters to be estimated.
Behavior
There was roughly at least a 10% share of each quantity 6 to 11 (see Figure 1) . The frequency of the symmetric joint-optima was low, because only 40/418 rounds resulted in the joint-optimum and only 3/22 pairs stayed at the joint-optimum for more than two consecutive rounds. The players were less cooperative than in the literature. As a comparison, in the repeated Cournot duopoly experiment of Huck et al. (2001) , the mean production quantity was 7.6 (SD ϭ 2.04). The mean cooperation index 3 was Ϫ.18 (SD ϭ .87), clearly lower than in the literature (Huck et al., 2001; Potters & Suetens, 2009 ).
There was a higher proportion of ideal jointoptimum outcomes, 206/836, than actual jointoptimum outcomes. In 153/836 cases the outcome was equal to the ideal outcome. However, there were far more cases, 436/836, where the player's own quantity equaled his own ideal quantity but the other's quantity did not equal the ideal quantity set to the other. Overall, because the ideal other's quantities were lower than the actual other's production quantities (see Figure 1) , the payoff differences in the ideal outcomes were larger than in the actual outcomes. The mean ideal other's quantity increased .044 (SEM ϭ .015) units during each round (LMM with round as the single fixed effect), t(791) ϭ 2.99, p ϭ .0029, b ϭ 1.28, ϭ 1.76, 1 ϭ .34, whereas the mean ideal own quantity did not change in time (LMM with round as the single fixed effect), t(791) ϭ Ϫ1.48, p ϭ .14, b ϭ 1.57, ϭ 1.68, 1 ϭ .36. Because the ideal other's quantity increased and the ideal own quantity remained unchanged, the ideal outcomes became more equal in payoffs in time.
Studying how the payoffs changed in a round, we found that the production quantity was adjusted upward on round t ϩ 1 if the other player had gained between rounds t Ϫ 1 and t (see Figure 2 ) but the player himself had not gained. In the other cases, the production quantity was adjusted downward on round t ϩ 1. These cases were when both lost, when only the player himself gained, and when both gained.
Emotional Reactions to Outcomes
Emotional arousal was activated when players mutually lost with respect to previous round payoffs (see Figure 2) . Emotional arousal was not activated on viewing outcomes where players mutually gained or where players had onesided gains or losses.
The disgust and positive affect expressions were activated on viewing changes in the results in a round (see Figure 3) . The disgust expression was activated more frequently (Probit score larger than zero) when there was an own gain than in other situations and less frequently (Probit score smaller than zero) when both lost than in other situations. The positive affect expression was activated more frequently (Probit score larger than zero) when both gained than in other situations and less frequently (Probit score smaller than zero) when the other gained than in other situations.
The anger expression was not activated differentially in the situations where payoffs changed (Probit scores not different from zero; see Figure 3 ). However, we found that the anger expression was related to observing that the outcome equaled the ideal outcome: The anger expression was activated less frequently (Probit score Ϫ.89 [SEM ϭ .42]) when the ideal outcome was equal to the outcome than when it was not (updated GLMM from Figure 3 with the added fixed interaction effect between two dichotomous dummy variables, whether the ideal outcome was equal to the outcome or not and choosing own ideal or not; z ϭ Ϫ2.12, p ϭ .034). The disgust and the positive affect expressions were not activated in this situation (analysis was similar to that with anger; disgust z ϭ Ϫ.34, p ϭ .73; positive affect z ϭ Ϫ.82, p ϭ .41). To corroborate that an emotional reaction was indeed elicited when observing that the outcome was equal to the ideal outcome, we observed that the integrated SCR score increased in the log scale by .076 (SEM ϭ .034) Ss when the other player's quantity was equal to the ideal quantity from .31 (SEM ϭ .056) Ss when the other player's was not equal to the ideal quantity (LMM with a dichotomous
, where x N ϭ 8 is the Cournot-Nash production quantity and x J ϭ 6 is the joint-optimum production quantity. The cooperation index varies between Ϫ1 and 1, and ϭ 1 for the joint-optimum outcome, ϭ 0 in the Cournot-Nash outcome, and ϭ Ϫ1 in the case where competition is perfect, that is, where price equals marginal cost (Potters & Suetens, 2009). fixed effect, restricting to those subjects who chose their ideal production quantity; N ϭ 535, t(496) ϭ 2.23, p ϭ .026, b ϭ .062, ϭ .066, 1 ϭ .42).
Emotional Activity During Decision-Making
Emotional arousal during the result-viewing stage of round t Ϫ 1 was reasonably well correlated with arousal during decision-making on round t (Pearson's productϪmoment correlation coefficient ϭ .61, t(720) ϭ 20.53, p Ͻ .001). This implies that the emotional activity when viewing the outcomes may have still influenced decision-making on the next round.
To study how emotional activity specifically related to the production quantity adjustments on round t, we formed an LMM with two continuous covariates: emotional arousal and decision time during decision-making on round t. Decision time was included to indirectly represent the cognitive system activity (Elster, 1998; Krajbich, Oud, & Fehr, 2014) . Three dichotomous contrasts were then used to form interaction terms with the covariates. These were as follows: the case where the player himself had cooperated but the other had not, that is, x i ϭ 6 and x j Ն 8 on round t Ϫ 1 (64/836 such cases in total); the case where both players had cooperated, that is, where x i , x j ϭ 6 on round t Ϫ 1 (76/836 cases); and the case where the outcome was equal to the ideal outcome on round t Ϫ 1 (138/836 cases). The latter case was included to control for a possible motivation to adjust based on the ideal outcome. The estimation results show that the adjustments were related to emotional arousal but not to decision time (see Table 1 ). The interaction effects show that after the other had not cooperated, the upward adjustment was higher, the higher the level of emotional arousal was. There were no significant interaction effects relating to the two other contrasts, that is, the cases of both cooperating on the previous round or having an outcome equal to the ideal outcome on the previous round.
Discussion
Repeated social dilemma games have long been of interest to behavioral and experimental economists. Fouraker and Siegel (1963) , early researchers in this field, argued that in the repeated Cournot duopoly game there are players who care about fairness and reciprocity. In addition to "the self-regarding maximizer," there is "the rivalist," who "derives satisfaction from reducing the gain accorded to the opposition Figure 1 . Distributions of own production quantities, ideal own quantities, and ideal other's quantities (N ϭ 836). Horizontal axis denotes quantity and vertical axis denotes the share over all rounds and subjects. and desires to surpass his rival," and "the cooperator who makes rewarding choices either in hopes of enhancing his own profits in the long run or because he derives satisfaction from the prosperity of his opponent" (p. 91).
Although cooperative behavior was clearly less frequent in our experiment than in comparable experiments in the literature, 4 the players did use adjustments to correct for relative changes in payoffs between the rounds. The analysis of decisions showed that the players used upward adjustments after the other's onesided gain in payoffs between the rounds, downward adjustments after an own one-sided gain or mutual losses, and downward adjustments after mutual gains. The upward adjustment after the other's one-sided gain can be interpreted as a punishment. These results are similar to those in other experiments with repeated social dilemma games, and they demonstrate that players generally aim for cooperative outcomes by reciprocal decisions. These adjustments form the behavioral basis for our psychophysiological measurement correlations. Hypothesis 1a, concerning emotional arousal, is supported. Emotional arousal as represented by autonomic activity during the results viewing stage was activated in mutual losses in a round. This result is in line with those of other studies, evidencing that the ANS reacts to decision outcomes (Ben-Shakhar, Bornstein, Hopfensitz, & van Winden, 2007; Dunn, Evans, Makarova, White, & Clark, 2012; Joffily, Masclet, Noussair, & Villeval, 2014; Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003; van 't Wout, Kahn, Sanfey, & Aleman, 2006) . In our setting, this possibly indicates that the players viewed mutual losses as the most alerting events in the course of the game and that the ANS responses to other events (mutual gains and one-sided losses and gains) remain undetected in our study. We could also speculate, contrasting the mutual losses to situations with payoff gains, that the ANS response in the mutual losses situation is indicative of loss aversion, where the experience of a loss is stronger than the experience of a comparable gain (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984) . In earlier studies, ANS activity has also been associated with loss aversion (Hochman & Yechiam, 2011; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009) . It has been suggested that loss aversion has deep evolutionary origins in the emotional system of the brain, mainly in the amygdala (Camerer, 2005; De Martino, Camerer, & Adolphs, 2010) . However, our experimental setting is not well suited for testing the psychophysiological basis of loss aversion in games.
We found that the disgust expression was activated when observing one-sided own gains in payoffs in a round. This supports Hypothesis 1c. This finding complements the understanding gained in previous research of how the disgust emotion can arise in strategic decision-making. In addition to being a response to unfairness (Chapman, Kim, Susskind, & Anderson, 2009) , the disgust emotion can arise when observing that one has been unfair himself. These findings are in agreement with the theories of inequity aversion ( Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) , where humans are predicted to be averse not only to disadvantageous payoff distributions but also to advantageous payoff distributions. Our study indicates that disgust is the basic human aversive emotion that shows up when payoff distributions are unequal.
The emergence of disgust when one has unilaterally gained is a novel result. This situation represents aversion to advantageous inequity (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) , that is, aversion of situations where one is at a payoff advantage relative to the other. However, this aversive reaction to advantageous inequity has a clear evolutionary foundation. A situation of advantageous inequity is likely followed by a costly punishment from the other player, and this costly punishment leads the pair to worsening payoffs. Therefore, the disgust expression alerts the player before ending up in a situation where the players move further away from the cooperative outcome.
It is also noteworthy that the activation frequency of the disgust expression was reduced on viewing results where both players lost payoffs in a round. Because the disgust expression is not known to be reciprocally activated on negative and positive valence (i.e., heightened in the former and inhibited in the latter with respect to the baseline), it is possible that the finding of reduced disgust frequency was caused by crosstalk due to volume conduction (van Boxtel, 2010) with some other facial emotional expression to which the activation of the orbicularis occuli muscle region that shares close proximity with the levator labii (Tassinary, Cacioppo, & Vanman, 2007) is specific.
The positive affect expression was activated when observing mutual gains in payoffs and inhibited when observing the other's one-sided gains in payoffs in a round. This result supports Hypothesis 1d and is a clear demonstration of the involvement of positive affect in cooperation where increases in cooperation are experienced pleasantly and decreases unpleasantly. However, some other studies have argued that the positive affect expression cannot be reciprocally activated in pleasant versus unpleasant stimuli (e.g., Larsen, Norris, & Cacioppo, 2003) , as it did in our study. These arguments are based on experimental evidence as well as on the neurophysiology of the zygomaticus major. The possibility that our result is explained by crosstalk is smaller in the positive affect expression than in the disgust expression, because the zygomaticus major muscle area is distinct from the orbicularis occuli and because our EMG scoring method reduces these crosstalk effects between the disgust and positive affect expressions.
Unlike the disgust and positive affect expressions, the anger expression was not activated when observing changes in the outcomes in a round. Therefore, we did not find support for Hypothesis 1b. In light of the support that we gained for the role of the disgust expression (Hypothesis 1c), this is not surprising: Disgust and anger are, after all, differently motivated emotions. Together the support for Hypothesis 1b and nonsupport for Hypothesis 1c indicates that the emotion behind aversion to inequitable payoff distributions is disgust and not anger. , x j tϪ1 ϭ 6 and 0 otherwise. "Ideal is equal" is 1 if the outcome was the ideal outcome on the previous round and 0 otherwise. Subjects enter the model as random effects. The model has an AR(2) correlation structure. ‫ء‬ p Ͻ .05.
‫ءءء‬ p Ͻ .001.
However, we did find that anger was less often expressed when the outcome was equal to the ideal outcome than when it was not. This finding possibly reflects the role of anger in restoring a state that is viewed as desirable (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Fischer & Roseman, 2007) . It also demonstrates the known pattern where activity in the corrugator supercilii, in addition to being increased in unpleasant stimuli, is decreased from the baseline in pleasant stimuli (Cannon, Schnall, & White, 2011; Larsen et al., 2003) . In light of this evidence, the subjects experienced reaching the ideal outcomes pleasantly.
Our results support Hypothesis 2a, on the relationship between a punitive adjustment and emotional arousal, but not Hypothesis 2b, which states that a defective adjustment increases in emotional arousal. From the literature, one can draw two possible roles for the emotional system in our setting. Emotional arousal arises when either the subject punishes the other for not cooperating or the subject himself does not cooperate and suffers the emotional consequences (Sütterlin, Herbert, Schmitt, Kübler, & Vögele, 2011) . Our evidence points to the former role. The upward adjustment in production quantity increased in emotional arousal after the other had not cooperated. This implies that the emotional system was involved in the decision to incur an upward adjustment, which can be seen as a punishment for not cooperating. The results are a possible sign of prefrontal inhibition, that is, decreased top-down cognitive control of goal-directed action (Miller & Cohen, 2001; Ochsner, Silvers, & Buhle, 2012) . After the other player had not cooperated, low or nonexistent emotional activity was related to not making an adjustment or to making only a small upward adjustment to trigger the noncooperative equilibrium. High emotional activity was related to making a large upward adjustment, which is costly for both players. Hence, the upward adjustment in production quantity was evidently correlated with the level of emotional activity and was not part of a completely rational strategy.
We find that, as a summary of the results, emotional arousal can act as an alert signal of mutual losses due to diminishing cooperation. Positive affect indicates enjoyment of establishing mutual gains when the players move toward the cooperative outcome. Disgust relates to aversion toward advantageous inequity, that is, aversion toward situations where one is better off than the other. Our final observation is that arousal is related to costly punishment, implying that automated processing (as indicated by the level of arousal) is in an important role not only in the motivations for actions but also in the action itself. We conclude that cooperative behavior in the repeated Cournot duopoly game that our subjects played clearly has an emotional basis.
Conclusions
By correlating psychophysiological measurements with the analysis of decisions that the players make, we demonstrate how emotions are involved as process measures in decisionmaking in a social dilemma game. We found that emotional arousal was elicited when both players lost in payoffs, the positive affect expression was displayed when both players gained in payoffs, and the disgust expression was displayed when only the player himself gained in payoffs in a round. We also found that an upward adjustment resulted after the other player had not cooperated. The size of this adjustment correlated with the level of emotional activity in the ANS. The results shed light on the question of what motivates cooperative behavior in repeated interactions and demonstrably disagree with the idea that behavior in a repeated social dilemma game is adaptive and strategic and devoid of emotions. The results also disagree with the claim provided by recent behavioral experiments (Cabral, Ozbay, & Schotter, 2014; Dreber, Fudenberg, & Rand, 2014; Reuben & Suetens, 2012 ) that cooperation in repeated games is mainly driven by self-regarding motives.
